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15.1  Introduction 
The dichotomy between pegged and floating exchange rate systems goes 
as far back in economic analysis as Ricardo and has generated an enormous 
literature  on  the  reasons  for  choice  of  different  exchange  rate  regimes 
(Tower and Willett 1976). More recently, economists have begun to analyze 
alternative regimes of  monetary control, both from analytical (Poole 1970) 
and institutional (Hodgman 1974) points of  view. The analytical and insti- 
tutional viewpoints on monetary control have been effectively combined by 
Modigliani  and  Papademos (1980) in  a paper on  alternative techniques of 
monetary control in a closed economy. These latter papers have focused on 
the domestic aspects of  monetary policy,  such as the use of  interest rates, 
reserve aggregates, or credit controls as means of  influencing the economy. 
(See also Atkinson, Blundell-Wignall, and Chouraqui 198  1  .) 
A  recent  notable  paper  by  Dale  Henderson  (1982) has  begun  to  draw 
some of  the  parallels between  the  analysis of  pegged  versus floating  ex- 
change rate regimes and alternative monetary control techniques. In  an ele- 
gant generalization of  Poole’s  analysis to  the  open economy,  Henderson 
shows that when all disturbances affect the financial sector, the authorities 
should hold interest and exchange rates constant to minimize fluctuations in 
output,  allowing money  stocks  and  international reserves to  fluctuate  in- 
stead. On the other hand, when all disturbances affect the real sector, inter- 
est and exchange rates should be allowed to  fluctuate, holding constant the 
stocks of  international reserves and money supplies. In  general, a managed 
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float is appropriate. Henderson’s analytical approach, which is both power- 
ful and revealing, lacks the degree of  institutional detail that would enable 
one to compare actual alternative mechanisms of  monetary control and ex- 
change rate  policies in  different countries.  In section  15.2 of  this paper  I 
generalize the  Modigliani and  Papademos model  to  the open  economy  in 
order to provide an  effective framework for such an  analysis.  I  show that 
the choice between alternative methods of  monetary control carries with  it 
logical implications for the type of exchange rate regime that is appropriate. 
There is  thus  a natural  parallelism in exchange rate  policy  and  monetary 
policy that goes beyond Henderson’s analytical results based on the types of 
disturbances facing the economy. 
In section  15.3 of  the  paper  I  compare the exchange rate  policies and 
monetary control regimes of  ten industrialized countries (Belgium, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United King- 
dom,  and  the United  States). The parallelism predicted  in section  15.2 is 
borne out in reality, with some interesting variations. In section  15.4, I then 
compare some empirical reaction functions for monetary and exchange rate 
policies in these ten countries. Section 15.5 offers some conclusions. 
15.2 An Open Economy Model of Financial Structure 
The basic Modigliani-Papademos model for a closed economy contains an 
IS  curve equilibrium condition for the domestic goods market, an LM curve 
for the  M1  money  market,  an  aggregate supply relationship for the price 
level, and an equilibrium condition in  the market for bank credit. This dif- 
fers  from  the traditional neo-Keynesian model  only by  the  substitution of 
intermediated bank credit for the more customary government and/or private 
bond market. The IS, LM, and BB curves are shown to intersect as usual in 
(r, Y)  space, so that monetary control can focus either on M1  or on bank 
credit. Under uncertainty, the relative stability of  the various curves deter- 
mines the optimal choice of  monetary instruments. Credit rationing appears 
when  the  savings deposit  rate  is not  allowed to  move to  clear the credit 
market. 
An open economy version of  this model simply requires the inclusion of 
a foreign good and its domestic price level ep*, a foreign component for the 
domestic monetary base, foreign sources of credit to the domestic economy, 
and  a foreign interest rate  rf  in  addition to  the  domestic loan  rate  r  and 
savings deposit rate r,. It is assumed that  the domestic and  foreign goods 
are imperfect substitutes and that domestic and foreign credit are imperfect 
substitutes because of  differences in currency denomination and the associ- 
ated exchange risk. Thus r,  is defined to include the expected change in the 
exchange rate e. 
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which is divided into five sectors: deficit units, surplus units, private banks, 
the central bank,  and  the rest  of  the world.  Flows are shown in  constant 
price terms,  with  sources negative and uses positive.  Each column of  the 
table represents a sectoral sources-uses statement and hence sums to zero. 
Each row  represents a market equilibrium condition, of which only six are 
independent, given the columnar balance sheet constraints and the definition 
of  M2  as the  sum of  M1  and  savings deposits.  The markets  for savings 
deposits (SD) and  foreign loans  (NFB)  are assumed  to  face an  infinitely 
elastic supply at,  respectively, a constant spread of  the loan rate  over the 
deposit rate r - r, = d and a constant foreign rate of interest rr. The market 
for bank  reserves (RES) is assumed to face infinitely elastic demand at a 
zero interest rate.  Thus the six independent market equilibrium conditions 
will be capable of  determining the six variables, Y, r, SD, NFB, RES, and 
e or NFA'',  together with  a supply side to determine the price level.  We 
now proceed to specify the behavioral relationships that allow this equilib- 
rium to be analyzed. 
The  IS  equation  (1)  for equilibrium in  the  goods market  sets domestic 
investment plus exports equal to private saving plus the value of imports in 
terms of domestic goods. Expected signs are shown above the arguments. 
(1) 
+  -  --  - 
I( r, r,,  rf) + EX(p/ep*) = S(Y) + (ep*/p) 
++ 
IM( Y,  p / ep*). 
Income is defined as the value of domestic output deflated by  the consumer 
price index 
Y= pX(p)/P. 
Consumer prices p  are given by a weighted average of domestic and foreign 
prices. 
Table 15.1  Flow of Funds 
Markets 
Deficit  Surplus  Private  Centrd  Rest of 
Units  Units  Banks  Bank  World 
(i)  Goods  Id - Sd  I, - S,  0  0  EX  - IM 
(ii)  Bank  reserves  0  0  RES - NDACb NDACb -  RES  0 
(iii)  M1  Lid,  L1,  -(MI  -  C)  -C  0 
(iv)  Savings deposits  0  SD,  -SD  0  0 
[(v)  M2 = (iii) + (iv)  L2,  L2,  -(M2  -  C)  -C  01 
(vi)  Bank loans  -  BL  0  B  0  0 
(vii)  Foreign loans  -  FB  FLO  0  NFB 
(viii)  Foreign assets  0  0  NFAP~  NFA~~  -  NFA 
Note: In constant prices, sources ( -  ) and uses ( +  ). 502  Stanley W. Black 
(3)  p = pyep*)’-”. 
The supply of real output is taken to be an increasing function of domestic 
prices X(p) because of the existence of wage contracts set in nominal terms. 
The supply of M1 is taken to depend in the product of a money multiplier 
k(r)  and  the  monetary  base,  defined  as  the  sum  of  the  net  domestic  and 
foreign assets of the central bank, The demand for MI depends on the usual 
income,  prices, and interest rates. 
(4)  k(r)(NDACb + NFACb) = pLl(r,  rs,  Y) 
The credit market is analyzed by considering separately deficit units, who 
are assumed to hold neither savings deposits nor foreign assets, and surplus 
units, who are assumed not to borrow either at home or abroad but who may 
lend abroad. The real value of bank borrowing by deficit units is then equal 
to  (table  15.1, column  1)  the  excess  of  their  investment  over their  own 
saving, plus their accumulation of real balances of  transactions money,  less 
the real value of their foreign borrowing. 
--  + 
--  +  -+  -+- 
B(r,  rf,  Y)  = IAr,  rf) -  &(Y)  + ALlAr, Y) 
+- 
-  FB(r,  rf). 
The government  is not considered  separately but may  be thought  of  as an 
exogenous  deficit  unit.  Acquisition of  real  balances  by surplus units in the 
form  of  MI plus  savings  deposits  is  equal  to (table  15.1, column  2) the 
excess of  their  saving over investment  less the  real  value  of  their foreign 
lending. Capital gains and losses are ignored in this accounting. 
Subtracting  (6) from (3,  defining  the  total  change in  the liabilities of  the 
banking  system  as  AL2  =  AL2,  +  ALld and  net  foreign  borrowing  as 
NFB = FB  -  FL. we have the sources and uses of credit in real terms. 
+  -+-  ++  - 
(7)  S(Y) + B(r, rp Y)  + NFB (r, rs, rf) 
-+  f +  --  - 
= I( r, r,,  rf) + AL2( r, rs, rf, Y). 
Thus  saving  plus  bank  borrowing  plus  net  foreign  borrowing  must  equal 
investment plus accumulation of  real balances in  the form of  M2. Equation 
(7) is equivalent  to  the  sum of the first two columns of  table  15.1, and  is 
therefore an identity. 
The consolidated balance sheet for the banking system as a whole, includ- 
ing the  central  bank  together  with  the commercial  and  savings banks, re- 
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change in  net  foreign  assets,  again  as  an  identity  from columns  3  and 4 
of table  15.1: 
-+  ++  -+-  -+ 
(8)  AL2( r, rs, rf,  Y)  = B( r, rf, Y)  + ANFApb( r, rf) 
Substituting into the foreign asset equilibrium condition from the rest of the 
world sectoral statement of sources and uses of funds yields the balance of 
payments: 
(9) 
+ AN FA'^. 
++  - 
EX(p / ep*) - (ep*/p)  IM(p / ep*,  Y ) 
= AN FA*^( -+  r, rf) + AN FA^^. 
15.1.1 Model  1: Control of MI 
When  monetary  control  is  exercised  via  manipulation  of  the  monetary 
base to achieve a target level of M1, the model is similar to the standard IS- 
LM  model.  Equations (2) and (3) can be  solved for p( Y,  ep  *) which can 
then be used to eliminate p  from the  model.  Competition in intermediation 
yields the condition r, = r -  d, which can be used to eliminate rs.  In figure 
15.1, equation  (1) yields the  downward-sloping  IS  curve, equation (4) the 
upward-sloping  LM1  curve, and equation (7) the  ambiguously  signed CR, 
or credit-market  curve. As usual, the three curves must intersect in a com- 
mon  point  A. Under  a floating  exchange  rate  regime,  the  foreign  balance 
curve from equation (9) will also pass through point A  with A NFACb  = 0. 
Under  a pegged  rate this  will  no  longer necessarily  be  true.  The resulting 
endogenous movements of reserves will directly influence the location of the 
++ 
LM  1 
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IS-LM-CR  intersection,  as any nonsterilized portion of reserve flows causes 
the monetary base to rise or fall. 
It  is the obvious  ability of  the  floating  rate regime  to cut off the  endo- 
geneity of the monetary base that makes a floating rate attractive to countries 
that wish to control M1. Note that the ability to sterilize the monetary effects 
of reserve flows mitigates the institutional  attractiveness of a float.  On the 
other hand,  if  most of the net domestic  assets of the central  bank  are held 
in  the  form  of  direct,  nonmarketable  claims  on the  private  banks  or  the 
government,  the  central  bank  may  not  be  willing  to offset  reserve  move- 
ments completely. 
15.1.2 Model 2: Control of Credit 
An  alternative  method  of  controlling  the  monetary  system,  whose  wide 
use in practice is discussed in section  15.3 of the paper, is direct control of 
bank lending. Assuming that price movements can be adequately  taken into 
account in setting the limits on bank credit, this can be expressed as a limit 
to the real volume of bank lending. 
If  we  assume that  the  loan  rate  adjusts to clear  the  loan  market,  stability 
conditions require the BB curve in figure 15.2 to be flatter than the IS curve. 
Credit restriction  in this  model takes the form of  an upward  shift in the 
BB curve, which raises interest rates and reduces investment and income. 
As interest rates rise under credit restrictions, nonbanks would be induced 
to increase their foreign  borrowing  as an  alternative  source of  finance (see 
equation  [7]),  generating  a  capital  inflow.  As in  model  1, with  a pegged 
exchange rate, the equilibrium point can be above or below the foreign bal- 
ance, or FB curve.  However, the resulting influx or efflux of reserves is not 
1 
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allowed to affect the level of  bank credit under this regime. Although the 
level of M2 will rise or fall with the balance of  payments, the primary tool 
of  monetary control is not directly undermined by  the international flows. 
This contrasts  sharply  with  the  situation in  model  1  under  a pegged  ex- 
change rate. 
On the other hand, credit controls combined with a pegged exchange rate 
can create problems. Nonbank channels of credit can be opened up to bypass 
the credit restriction. Controls over bank lending frequently take the form of 
specifying direct limits on the growth of  bank credit by  individual banks. 
This prevents banks from bidding for funds in the credit market and distorts 
the  allocation  of  investment.  An  alternative,  but  seldom  used,  approach 
would specify reserve requirements on bank lending and limit the total avail- 
able reserves. 
15.1.3 Model 3: Control of Bank Credit and Net Foreign Assets 
As  noted above,  simply controlling bank credit with a pegged exchange 
rate leaves the balance of payments free to fluctuate with changes in other 
internal and external conditions. The level of international reserves may not 
always be  adequate to  finance these fluctuations, even  if  the level  of  the 
pegged  exchange  rate  is  appropriate in  the  long-run  sense of  purchasing 
power parity. The addition of  controls over the net foreign asset position of 
banks might seem to be a logical way to guarantee external balance along 
with  internal balance in  the context of  a pegged  exchange rate.  Unfortu- 
nately, it should be obvious from equation (9) that the only way to control 
the rural net foreign asset position of  private banks together with the central 
bank is to adopt exchange controls over private sector transactions, with all 
of  the  ill  effects  that  such  controls  can  be  expected to  yield  (Bhagwati 
1978). Simply controlling the private banks’ net foreign asset positions will 
reduce the variability of only one element of the balance of payments, which 
will often be acting to finance the payments of other sectors. 
The  adoption of  total  foreign exchange controls allows M2  as  well  as 
bank  credit  to  become  independent  of  balance-of-payments flows.  From 
equation (8), the change in M2 must equal the credit target B: 
+-+ 
AL2(r, rrp Y)  = B.  (12) 
The resulting LM2 curve in figure  15.3 will be downward sloping and, as 
Modigliani and Papademos argue, steeper than the IS curve for stability. 
15.1.4 Model 4: Controls Plus Credit Rationing 
The extension of controls over bank credit and possibly exchange market 
transactions is likely to lead  the  authorities to  prevent  interest rates from 
moving to clear the loan market, as was assumed above. In this case, true 
credit rationing will  arise,  in  the sense of unsatisfied demand for credit at 506  Stanley W. Black 
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existing  interest  rates.  The inducement  to  seek  nonbank  channels  of  un- 
regulated finance, including foreign borrowing,  will increase dramatically in 
this  situation.  Furthermore, the misallocation of credit caused by  arbitrary, 
nonprice rationing will sharply exacerbate the problems raised by credit ceil- 
ings on  individual banks. 
From an analytical point of view, the restriction  of  credit via an upward 
shift in  the  BB curve  in combination  with  interest  rate  ceilings  would  be 
expected  to reduce  saving  and  investment  at the  given  interest  rate.  This 
could  be  seen diagrammatically  as a  clockwise  pivoting  of  the  IS  curve 
through the unconstrained equilibrium point, forcing a reduction in output. 
Such  a monetary  policy  regime  would  encourage  the  use  of  a  pegged 
exchange rate with exchange controls over all private capital flows, in order 
to reduce the tendency of  unsatisfied borrowers to turn to foreign sources of 
capital. A floating exchange rate would generate substantial upward pressure 
on the exchange rate during restrictive periods, followed by downward pres- 
sure during expansionary periods. 
15.3 A Classification of Exchange Rate and Monetary Policy Regimes 
in Ten Countries 
Actual exchange rate and monetary policy regimes do not fall neatly  into 
pigeonholes  labeled  “pegged,”  “floating,”  “control  of MI ,” or  “control 
of bank  credit.”  Even a pegged exchange rate fluctuates freely between its 
upper  and  lower limits  and can have  the  limits  changed.  And,  as  recent 
experience has made clear, most cases of floating rates involve a significant 
degree of management via central bank intervention in the exchange market. 
Furthermore,  the existence of  generalized  floating  among the  major  world 
currencies  since 1973 has made it  impossible  for any country  to do more 
than peg to a subset of  the rest of the world’s currencies. 507  Exchange Rate Policy and Monetary Policy in Ten Industrial Countries 
The simple  classification  of  a currency  as “pegged”  or “floating,”  as 
seen,  for  example, in  International Financial  Statistics, thus  needs  to be 
supplemented  by  some additional  information on  the  degree  of  flexibility 
allowed  in  the  exchange rate.  Table  15.2 shows  in  column  1  the  formal 
classification  of each country’s exchange rate regime during the  1970s, but 
columns 2 and 3 add information on the variability of the effective exchange 
rate  and central bank  intervention relative to GDP. As might  be expected, 
countries with floating rates have higher average variability in their effective 
exchange rates than countries which peg (1.65 vs.  1.29), although Belgium 
and the Netherlands rank lower than the other “peggers.” 
The second half of table  15.2 classifies countries according to differences 
in  monetary  policy.  Column 4 gives  the  primary  monetary  target,  while 
column 5 indicates the primary  instrument through  which  monetary policy 
is carried out. Whenever the primary target is M1 or the monetary base, the 
main operating instrument is open market operations (or equivalent changes 
in reserve  requirements,  as in Germany).  By contrast,  whenever the  main 
target  is domestic credit or M2, credit controls are often used as a primary 
instrument of monetary policy. (It should, of course, be recognized that this 
oversimplifies  institutional  differences  and  changes  in  the  use  of  instru- 
ments, which are more carefully spelled out in Black  [1983]). 
Column  6 of  table  15.2 gives  a measure of  the frequency  of  change  of 
the discount rate in each country, a measure of the authorities’  willingness 
to allow interest rates to fluctuate. This measure is relatively low in France, 
Italy,  Japan,  and  Sweden.  Columns  7  and  8 provide  information  on  the 
average rate of inflation in each country during the 1970s and its variability. 
Italy and the United Kingdom of course stand out as high-inflation countries, 
while Japan has also had a comparably high variability of inflation. 
In order to throw  more  light on  the  interrelationship  between  monetary 
policies and exchange rate policies,  table 15.3 cross-classifies  the informa- 
tion in table 15.2 according to whether a country was pegged or floating and 
used credit controls or primarily open market operations in monetary policy. 
Remarkably,  the  differences  between  floaters  that  use  credit  controls  and 
floaters that use open market operations are often greater than the difference 
between the latter and peggers.  The parallels between  exchange rate policy 
and monetary policy  suggested  in the  analysis of  section  15.2 appear very 
evident in the data. 
The one group of countries that has broken  this  “law  of  parallelism”  in 
monetary and exchange rate policy, namely, the countries that float and use 
credit controls oriented toward  M2 or  the control of domestic credit, have 
had higher  average  inflation,  and  more variable  inflation, as well as more 
variable exchange rates. Apparently,  reliance on market forces to determine 
exchange rates and credit controls to limit  monetary growth  is a relatively 
unstable combination.  The German case, by contrast, is stable. 
The other two pairings,  which might be called  “pure”  peggers and float- Table 15.2  Measures of  Exchange Rate Policy and Monetary Policy, 1973-79 
Frequency 
Variability  Variability  Pnmary  Primary  of use of 
Monetary  Monetary  Discount  Inflation  Variability  Exchange  of Effective  of Inter- 

















































































"Countries listed as pegged are members of  the EMSEEC narrow margins arrangement. 
bStandard deviation of percentage change in monthly effective exchange rate, from International Financial Statistics 
'Standard  deviation of  monthly changes in foreign exchange reserves,  adjusted for swaps and  foreign borrowing,  as percentage of  1980 GDP in United States 
dollars. See Black (1980) for details. 
dDC = domestic credit, MO = monetary base. See OECD (1979) and Black (1983, appendix on institutions). 
'CC  = credit controls, OM0 = open market operations. See Black (1983, appendix on institutions). 
fPercentage of months in which discount rate was changed; see Black (1983) 
gMean and standard deviation of annual inflation rate of consumer price index. 509  Exchange Rate Policy and  Monetary Policy  in Ten Industrial Countries 
Table 15.3  Monetary Policy versus Exchange Rate Policy 
peg  Float  F-statistic 
A.  Variability of  effective exchange rate: 
Credit controls  1.20  1.88 
Open market operation  1.65  1.31 
Credit controls  .178  .202 
Open market operation  .165  ,084 
Credit controls  .18  .15" 
Open market operation  .19  .24 
Credit controls  8.22  12.0 
Open market operation  5.  I  1.5 
Credit controls  2.38  5.43 
Open market operation  1.37  2.54 
F(3.6) = 4.21 
B.  Variability of  intervention: 
Fo.61 = .72 
C.  Frequency of discount rate change: 
F~3.51  = 1.53 
D.  Average inflation rate 
F(3,,3 = 7.20 
E.  Variability of  inflation: 
F(2.7) = 23.12 
"Excluding the United Kingdom, which used a floating discount rate from October  1972. 
ers, appear to have performed more acceptably, on this limited but sugges- 
tive evidence. The pure peggers, for example, had lower variability of their 
exchange rates at the cost of  higher variability in their reserves, as compared 
with the pure floaters. The "mixed"  floaters, however, intervened about as 
much as the peggers and had much higher variability of  exchange rates, as 
did Germany. 
While the credit control countries, as expected, adjust interest rates less 
frequently than open market countries, the mixed floaters adjust them least. 
The  pure  floaters  had  Germany  appear to  have  the  best  inflation perfor- 
mance, with the pure peggers not far behind. The mixed floaters, however, 
are a poor third in inflation performance. 
15.4 Lessons from Studies of Reaction Functions 
In two recent papers I estimated central bank policy reaction functions for 
these same ten industrial countries for domestic monetary policy instruments 
(Black  1983) and  exchange market  intervention  (Black  1980). It  may  be 
useful, in the context of  this discussion, to summarize the findings of those 
studies that appear to be relevant to the relationship between the two types 
of policies. 
A general conclusion, which seems inescapable from the evidence, is that 
both internal targets such as inflation and unemployment and external targets 
such as competitiveness, the current account, and reserves are important in 
determining both domestic monetary policy and exchange rate intervention. 
However, the external targets, as might be expected, play a relatively larger 510  Stanley W. Black 
role in determining exchange rate intervention in most countries, judging by 
the relative number of  significant coefficients in reaction functions. And  of 
course for the countries with pegged  exchange rates, the proximity  of  the 
exchange rate  to the peg  is  a necessarily important factor,  which  is  con- 
firmed in the regressions. 
“Leaning  against  the  wind,”  in  the  sense  of  intervention  to  cushion 
movements of the exchange rate, appears to be  a widespread practice, (the 
same conclusion is found in  Artus [ 19761 and Quirk [ 19771). In  addition, 
movements in competitiveness appear to have set off counteracting interven- 
tion policies in some cases (Japan, Canada). Finally, large current account 
imbalances have  led  to  significant  intervention where  capital  flows  have 
been  inadequate to finance them at existing levels of  interest rates and ex- 
change rates (Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom). 
Interestingly enough,  these very  same factors appear to  be  the  external 
variables that  affect  “domestic”  monetary  policy,  such  as  interest rates, 
open market operations, reserve requirements, and credit controls. There is 
no doubt that the authorities have a choice to respond to external imbalance 
with either  “domestic”  or  “international”  instruments. This distinction of 
course implies the imperfect substitutability of  assets denominated in differ- 
ent currencies, since otherwise the only effective intervention would be in- 
distinguishable from domestic monetary policy. 
Less obviously,  the authorities can  also respond  to  internal  imbalances 
with alternative combinations of domestic and international instruments. For 
example,  in  1973-75  the  United  Kingdom and  Italy  both  used  exchange 
market intervention to resist the exchange rate implications of  domestic ex- 
pansion in the face of large current account imbalances. Again in 1977 they 
both used intervention to resist the exchange rate implications of  restrictive 
domestic policies. Conversely, in  1980 and  1981 the United States and the 
United Kingdom have chosen to accept the exchange rate appreciation that 
accompanies tight monetary policy, making it an evidently important part of 
the domestic policy package. 
Turning to domestic monetary policy  behavior itself,  the reaction  func- 
tions show, not surprisingly, that countries with pegged exchange rates give 
relatively high policy weights (not necessarily welfare weights) to external 
target variables. Floaters, on the other hand, typically give more emphasis 
in policy formulation to internal targets. 
As found in section 15.3 above, it is not the case that peggers necessarily 
do any  better  or worse  in  formulating  “domestic”  monetary  policy  than 
floaters. The worst inflation performance during the 1970s was that of Italy 
and the United Kingdom, both  floaters. The best performance was that of 
Germany and the United States, also both floaters. It is suggestive, however, 
that the former two are mixed floaters, which use credit controls, while the 
latter two use open market operations. Clearly, other factors must also be 
brought  into a full explanation of  these differences, including fiscal policy 
and the state of labor relations and indexation. 511 
15.5  Conclusion 
Exchange Rate Policy and Monetary Policy  in Ten Industrial Countries 
In  this paper  I have  argued that  there  is  a natural parallelism between 
exchange rate  and monetary policy  regimes,  which  arises out of  the eco- 
nomic logic of models in which monetary control is exercised either through 
control of  bank  reserves or control of  bank  credit.  I  have  shown that  the 
logic of the reserves model leads in the direction of a floating exchange rate, 
while the logic of the credit control model leads in the direction of a pegged 
rate. 
That logic was supported by  showing that six of ten major industrialized 
countries fell  into one  of  the  two  “pure”  cases,  and  that  these  six plus 
Germany had  achieved performances with  respect to internal and  external 
measures of  economic  stability  that  were  superior to  those  of  the  three 
“mixed”  countries which used floating exchange rates with credit controls. 
Finally,  I  pointed  out  that  reaction function studies reveal  an  intimate 
relationship between the conduct of  monetary policy and exchange rate pol- 
icy, since either policy may support or  undermine the other in affecting both 
domestic and  external  targets.  Differences  in exchange rate  regime  were 
shown to have a profound impact on the conduct of  monetary policy. My 
argument in this paper is that differences in the monetary policy regime can 
have  an  equally profound impact on  the choice of  exchange rate  policy, 
since credit controls do not mix well with a floating rate. 
15.6  Postscript 
Following discussion at the Conference, the classification of  Germany in 
tables  15.2 and  15.3 was  made consistent with  the other Snake countries, 
with  no  real  changes in  the  conclusions reached.  The comments by  Paul 
de Grauwe suggest an appropriate way to deal with a limitation in the ana- 
lytical model, and I accept them with enthusiasm. De Grauwe (1982) devel- 
ops an open economy financial model which addresses some of  the issues 
discussed above. 
Comment  Paul de Grauwe 
In his paper Stanley Black sets himself the task of  adding some institutional 
detail to  a classroom macromodel for an open economy.  In  particular, he 
models credit controls and other types of restrictions in order to see how the 
choice of  particular modes of  monetary policymaking affects the choice of 
the exchange rate regime. The attempt is similar to the one made recently 
by  McKinnon and  Mathieson  (1981) for  less  developed countries with  a 
heavily “repressed”  financial system. 
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controls  are  modeled  by  Stanley  Black  is  unsatisfactory  and  needs  some 
changes.  To show  this,  1 start  from  the  partial  equilibrium  model  of  the 
credit market,  as represented by figure 15.C.  1. On the vertical axis the loan 
rate is set out (this is r in  Black’s paper), on the horizontal axis the quantity 
of  loans is represented.  The LD curve is the demand curve for bank  loans, 
the Ls curve represents the supply of loans by banks. Equilibrium  is obtained 
in E. 
Given the banks’ balance sheet constraint, Ls is dependent on the willing- 
ness of the nonbank public to hold bank deposits (the demand for deposits). 
In other words, banks receive deposits from the public and lend these out, 
adding  a constant  margin  over the  deposit  rate.  This  is  basically  the  way 
Stanley Black  models the credit  market.  In  figure  15.C.1 this  implies that 
underlying Ls there is a demand for deposit equation D which is a positive 
function of the deposit rate r,  (represented by rs in Black’s paper). The L, 
curve is then nothing but the D curve plus a constant margin d. 
The problem  arises  when  credit  ceilings  are  introduced  and  when  one 
assumes, as Stanley Black does, that the margin  between  loan and deposit 
rates is  unchanged.  Suppose the  authorities  set  a quantitative  limit  on the 
amount of bank  loans. This is represented in  figure  15.C.2. The ceiling is 
set at L. It is assumed, first, that loans are the only earning assets of banks. 
Then it can easily be seen that it will be difficult to maintain a fixed margin 
d. The credit ceiling reduces the supply of loans to the level z,  so that the 
loan  rate  increases.  Given  their balance  sheet constraint,  banks  will try  to 
reduce the deposit rate in order to ration the amount of outstanding deposits. 
The result is an increase in the margin from d to d’ in figure  15.C.2. 
Now add the complication (as in Black’s model) that there are other earn- 
ing assets for the banks, such as foreign assets. In the flexible margin model 
of  figure  15.C.2, this would  lead  to a combination  of  an  increase  in  the 
margin and spillover investment in these other earning assets (the Ls curve 
shifts upward).  In  Black’s  model,  however, banks  are constrained to keep 
the  margin  constant.  Thus, as a result  of  the  credit  ceiling,  both  the  loan 
-- 
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and  the  deposit rate  must  increase,  so  that  banks  acquire  more deposits. 
Since they have to decrease their lending, the excess of deposits over loans 
must be  invested in these alternative assets (net foreign assets). 
This  fixed margin  model  yields a  surprising result:  that  credit ceilings 
necessarily increase the bank’s balance sheet-that  is, tbey actually increase 
the total  size of  banking intermediation. This result would not necessarily 
obtain if  the margin were allowed to change with  the imposition of  credit 
ceilings. 
A further problem arises because in Black’s model banks will not increase 
their net foreign assets (NFAp1). As can be  seen from equation (8), banks 
increase their net foreign assets if  the loan rate (r)  declines or if  the foreign 
rate (rf)  increases. Since after the imposition of a credit ceiling the loan rate 
increases, banks in Black’s model will not increase their net foreign assets. 
As a result the excess of deposits over loans is invested exclusively in non- 
interest-bearing reserves (RES). In fact, in Black’s model bank reserves per- 
form the role of  a slack variable which  automatically increases to enforce 
the balance sheet constraint following the imposition of  a credit ceiling. 
This implies that banks are willing to let the deposit rate increase, attract- 
ing  more  (and  more  expensive) deposits which  they  then  invest  in  non- 
interest-bearing assets.  Profitability  necessarily declines and  can even  be- 
come negative in  Black’s model  if credit ceilings are set sufficiently low. 
This will  certainly affect banks’  willingness  to  supply loans  and  to  issue 
deposits. The preceding criticism has further implications for some of  the 
results obtained in Black’s model. One result is that the imposition of credit 
controls induces a net capital inflow in a pegged exchange rate system and 
an appreciation of the currency in  a flexible exchange rate system. The rea- 
son is that unsatisfied borrowers turn to the foreign market and increase their 
foreign borrowings. In addition, the increased deposit rate leads to increased 
demand for domestic deposits from the rest  of  the world.  In a fixed rate 
system  this  leads to  a  net  capital  inflow, in  a  floating rate  system  to  an 
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In the alternative formulation of  a model with a flexible margin between 
deposit  and  loan  rate,  this effect of credit ceilings  is far from  obvious.  In 
such a model there  are two opposing tendencies.  The increase in the  loan 
rate leads domestic  borrowers  to increase their foreign  borrowings  (capital 
inflow); however, the decline  in the deposit rate shifts holders of domestic 
wealth into foreign assets (capital outflow).  The net effect is unclear a priori 
and will depend on  the relative strength of the two opposing forces. 
A final remark  concerns the  empirical evidence presented by  Black.  He 
finds that peggers rely more often than floaters on credit controls, and inter- 
prets this result in the light of his theoretical model.  The preceding discus- 
sion makes this interpretation less plausible.  I  would suggest an alternative 
interpretation:  countries  which  rely  on  credit  controls  are countries  where 
the monetary  authorities have  very  little faith in the price  mechanism as a 
device to allocate credit  efficiently.  For the  same reason,  these  authorities 
will tend to have little faith in the price mechanism as a device to determine 
an equilibrium  exchange rate  in the exchange  market.  Therefore,  it should 
come as no  surprise that  countries  with  an  extensive credit control system 
have resisted more than other countries the move toward flexible exchange 
rates. 
To conclude, Stanley Black  has  provided  us with  an  important piece of 
research,  which, although not yet  finished and in certain  respects even un- 
satisfactory, is one of the first attempts at integrating  more institutional de- 
tail in our macromodels for open economies. 
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